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A shadow banking crisis in China is not an outlandish fear. The country has already been dealing with one for the past year.
在中国，人们并非现在才开始担心影子银行业会爆发危机。过去一年里，中国一直在努力解决这个问题。
Many of the illegal loan shark operations in wealthy coastal areas, especially those in Wenzhou, an entrepreneurial hub south of Shanghai, have imploded. Long chains of underground financing deals, often based on predatory interest rates, collapsed as exports weakened and property prices tumbled.
在中国富裕的沿海地区、特别是温州（位于上海以南的民营企业集中地），许多非法的高利贷机构都已经倒闭。随着出口不断下滑、房价出现暴跌，漫长的地下融资链（往往是高息贷款）已经断裂。
The fallout has been severe and it has begun to hit the formal banking system. Chinese media have been full of stories of Wenzhou factory bosses absconding with unpaid debts, while residents tell of a few who have jumped from their office towers. The city’s courts heard 10,269 economic disputes, most related to loan defaults, in the first half of this year, almost twice as many as last year.
这件事的后果十分严重，而且已开始波及正规银行体系。中国媒体上充斥着关于温州工厂主欠钱跑路的报道。温州当地人说，还有一些工厂主因还不起债而跳楼。温州今年上半年审理了10269宗经济纠纷案，是去年全年的近两倍。这些案子大多与无力还贷有关。
The non-performing loan ratio at banks in Wenzhou rose to 3 per cent at the end of August, a decade high and up from a minuscule 0.4 per cent a year earlier. The central government has created a special bailout fund to repair the city’s financial system. It has also set up a closely observed experiment to take the initiative away from loan sharks by nurturing more private banks that can lend to Wenzhou’s small businesses.
截至今年8月底，温州银行业的不良贷款率升至3%，是十年来的最高点，而一年前这一数字仅为0.4%。中国中央政府已建立一支专项纾困基金，用以修复温州的金融体系。中央政府还启动了一项予以严密监控的试验：培育更多能向温州小企业放贷的民营银行，积极主动地根除高利贷的生存基矗
But the pain has been isolated. Because the loan sharks were so heavily concentrated in Wenzhou, there have been few ripples beyond the city. The non-performing loan ratio at Chinese banks nationwide was just 0.95 per cent at the end of the third quarter, nearly a record low.
不过，这个问题并不具有普遍性。由于高利贷在很大程度上集中在温州，因此在温州以外，这件事并没有产生多少连带影响。截至今年第三季度末，中国全国银行业体系的不良贷款率仅为0.95%，接近历史最低点。
If the legal shadow banking system collapsed, the fallout would be far more widespread. The trusts, wealth management products and entrusted loan operations that are China’s shadow banks are much bigger than the loan sharks, have a national footprint and, most worrying of all, are intertwined with traditional banks.
如果合法的影子银行业体系崩溃，影响的范围则会广得多。信托基金、理财产品和委托贷款业务这些合法的影子银行，规模要比高利贷大得多，业务范围遍及全国，而且最令人担心的是，它们与传统银行你中有我、我中有你。
“Banks are playing the role of ‘middlemen’ between the recipients and investors, Xiao Gang, Bank of China chairman, wrote in the China Daily. Banks do this in two ways.
中国银行(Bank of China)董事长肖钢在《中国日报》(China Daily)上撰文指出：“银行在被投资者和投资者之间扮演着‘中间人’角色。银行以两种方式来发挥“中间人作用。
First, they market investment products on behalf of trust companies. Second, they raise funds through WMPs, which they in turn invest in a range of assets, including shadow financing deals.
第一，银行代表信托公司推销投资产品。第二，银行通过理财产品筹集资金，然后用筹得的资金投资各种资产，包括一些影子融资交易。
One key question is whether any losses from shadow financing would be borne directly by banks. When banks market trust products or sell non-guaranteed WMPs, the transactions do not show up on their balance sheets. Yet this distinction may be meaningless if defaults occur.
一个关键问题是，影子融资出现的任何亏损，是否将由银行直接承担。银行推销信托产品或销售无担保理财产品时，交易并不体现在银行的资产负债表上。然而，如果发生违约，交易体不体现在银行资产负债表上，可能并没有什么实际区别。
Simon Ho, an analyst with Citi, says: “We believe many buyers of these products believe in an implicit guarantee [from banks].
花旗(Citi)分析师何德亮(Simon Ho)说：“我们认为，许多人购买这些产品，都是因为相信（银行）默认为这些产品提供担保。
A shadow banking crisis in China is not an outlandish fear. The country has already been dealing with one for the past year.
在中国，人们并非现在才开始担心影子银行业会爆发危机。过去一年里，中国一直在努力解决这个问题。
Many of the illegal loan shark operations in wealthy coastal areas, especially those in Wenzhou, an entrepreneurial hub south of Shanghai, have imploded. Long chains of underground financing deals, often based on predatory interest rates, collapsed as exports weakened and property prices tumbled.
在中国富裕的沿海地区、特别是温州（位于上海以南的民营企业集中地），许多非法的高利贷机构都已经倒闭。随着出口不断下滑、房价出现暴跌，漫长的地下融资链（往往是高息贷款）已经断裂。
The fallout has been severe and it has begun to hit the formal banking system. Chinese media have been full of stories of Wenzhou factory bosses absconding with unpaid debts, while residents tell of a few who have jumped from their office towers. The city’s courts heard 10,269 economic disputes, most related to loan defaults, in the first half of this year, almost twice as many as last year.
这件事的后果十分严重，而且已开始波及正规银行体系。中国媒体上充斥着关于温州工厂主欠钱跑路的报道。温州当地人说，还有一些工厂主因还不起债而跳楼。温州今年上半年审理了10269宗经济纠纷案，是去年全年的近两倍。这些案子大多与无力还贷有关。
The non-performing loan ratio at banks in Wenzhou rose to 3 per cent at the end of August, a decade high and up from a minuscule 0.4 per cent a year earlier. The central government has created a special bailout fund to repair the city’s financial system. It has also set up a closely observed experiment to take the initiative away from loan sharks by nurturing more private banks that can lend to Wenzhou’s small businesses.
截至今年8月底，温州银行业的不良贷款率升至3%，是十年来的最高点，而一年前这一数字仅为0.4%。中国中央政府已建立一支专项纾困基金，用以修复温州的金融体系。中央政府还启动了一项予以严密监控的试验：培育更多能向温州小企业放贷的民营银行，积极主动地根除高利贷的生存基矗
But the pain has been isolated. Because the loan sharks were so heavily concentrated in Wenzhou, there have been few ripples beyond the city. The non-performing loan ratio at Chinese banks nationwide was just 0.95 per cent at the end of the third quarter, nearly a record low.
不过，这个问题并不具有普遍性。由于高利贷在很大程度上集中在温州，因此在温州以外，这件事并没有产生多少连带影响。截至今年第三季度末，中国全国银行业体系的不良贷款率仅为0.95%，接近历史最低点。
If the legal shadow banking system collapsed, the fallout would be far more widespread. The trusts, wealth management products and entrusted loan operations that are China’s shadow banks are much bigger than the loan sharks, have a national footprint and, most worrying of all, are intertwined with traditional banks.
如果合法的影子银行业体系崩溃，影响的范围则会广得多。信托基金、理财产品和委托贷款业务这些合法的影子银行，规模要比高利贷大得多，业务范围遍及全国，而且最令人担心的是，它们与传统银行你中有我、我中有你。
“Banks are playing the role of ‘middlemen’ between the recipients and investors, Xiao Gang, Bank of China chairman, wrote in the China Daily. Banks do this in two ways.
中国银行(Bank of China)董事长肖钢在《中国日报》(China Daily)上撰文指出：“银行在被投资者和投资者之间扮演着‘中间人’角色。银行以两种方式来发挥“中间人作用。
First, they market investment products on behalf of trust companies. Second, they raise funds through WMPs, which they in turn invest in a range of assets, including shadow financing deals.
第一，银行代表信托公司推销投资产品。第二，银行通过理财产品筹集资金，然后用筹得的资金投资各种资产，包括一些影子融资交易。
One key question is whether any losses from shadow financing would be borne directly by banks. When banks market trust products or sell non-guaranteed WMPs, the transactions do not show up on their balance sheets. Yet this distinction may be meaningless if defaults occur.
一个关键问题是，影子融资出现的任何亏损，是否将由银行直接承担。银行推销信托产品或销售无担保理财产品时，交易并不体现在银行的资产负债表上。然而，如果发生违约，交易体不体现在银行资产负债表上，可能并没有什么实际区别。
Simon Ho, an analyst with Citi, says: “We believe many buyers of these products believe in an implicit guarantee [from banks].
花旗(Citi)分析师何德亮(Simon Ho)说：“我们认为，许多人购买这些产品，都是因为相信（银行）默认为这些产品提供担保。
