【简介】感谢网友“雕龙文库”参与投稿，这里小编给大家分享一些，方便大家学习。
Madrid’s role in the financial crisis has the erratic quality of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. It has veered unpredictably between embodying the euro’s greatest threat and pushing the reforms the monetary union badly needs. It is vital that the deal on eurozone financial assistance for Spain’s banks should be a step to a permanent solution and not a redoubling of past mistakes.
西班牙在金融危机中有点像“化身博士。它的角色飘忽不定，有时代表着欧元区最大的威胁，有时又在推进欧元区迫切需要的改革。欧元区对西班牙银行的救助应该是永久解决方案中的一步，而不应重蹈覆辙，这一点非常关键。
It is good that the agreement activates a new power granted to Europe’s rescue funds last year. Madrid will borrow money not for its main budget but for the Frob, its bank bailout fund. The assistance will be limited to the banking system, without Spain entering a programme subject to the eurozone-International Monetary Fund troika. This reward for genuine commitment to austerity and structural reform will hopefully prevent relations with Europe from becoming as poisoned as in some other countries.
所幸，此项救助协议激活了去年授予欧洲各救助基金的一项新权力。西班牙将把贷款用于本国的“银行有序重组基金(Frob)，而不是用于主要预算。援助将仅限于银行体系，西班牙不需要执行欧元区和国际货币基金组织(IMF)“三驾马车要求的项目。对实施紧缩和结构性改革的切实承诺予以奖励，西班牙与欧洲的关系将不至于弄僵，避免步其他一些国家的后尘。
The key dysfunction of the euro, however, is not addressed. Rather than sever the lethal embrace between stressed sovereign debt and weak banking systems, a cash advance to bail out banks with taxpayer funds adds to the burden of Madrid’s public finances. If the state of Spanish banks is much worse than expected, this action could amount to lending the country rope with which to hang itself – repeating the Irish mistake.
然而欧元最主要的功能障碍还是没有解决。用纳税人的资金来救助银行，不仅没有将问题主权债务与脆弱的银行体系之间致命的“纽带切断，还会加重西班牙公共财政的负担。如果西班牙银行业的状况明显比预期中更糟糕，此次行动就无异于借给该国上吊的绳子，这将重蹈爱尔兰的覆辙。
Until this prospect is banished, markets will not regain confidence in Spain, despite the strengths of its corporate sector, its structural reforms and a speedy macroeconomic adjustment. What is needed are bank resolution rules that cap taxpayer exposure. This means writing down shareholders and converting uninsured and unsecured debt into equity when banks cannot raise the capital they need.
如果这种可能性不消除，市场就无法对西班牙重拾信心，尽管西班牙企业状况良好、西班牙也在采取结构性改革和快速的宏观经济调整。现在需要的是拟定银行清理规则，其中要限定纳税人的负担。也就是说，当银行无法募集到需要的资金时，需要对股东减记，将没有保险和无担保的债务转变为股票。
If it dares, Madrid can take steps in this direction. It should stick to the €99bn envelope for the Frob’s investments – which means limiting the European credit line to the €80bn or so not already funded. It should also instruct the Frob not to inject capital before shareholders and creditors take a hit. That should make €80bn enough.
如果敢的话，西班牙可以在这个方向上采取行动，但应该在990亿欧元的“银行有序重组基金的框架下行动。也就是说，需要将欧洲信贷额度限制在尚未到位的800亿欧元。同时，还需要指示“银行有序重组基金，在股东和债权人承受损失之前不要向银行注入资金。因而800亿欧元是足够的。
The political obstacles are formidable. It would expose the political machinations behind banks that exploit public trust. Bankia, for example, flogged its shares to its retail savers, who will lose in a writedown. Also, Berlin is set against any losses for creditors as German savers and pensioners would be among them. Governments understandably fear the ire of victims of reckless banks. Protecting the banks themselves, however, only prolongs the problem.
政治阻碍令人生畏。这将暴露出利用公众信任的银行背后的政治图谋。比如Bankia就将其股票转移给个人储户，后者将在减记过程中遭受损失。同时，德国也反对债权人承受损失，因为一些德国储户和领养老金者就在债权人之列。政府担心行事轻率的银行的受害者会燃起熊熊怒火，这可以理解。然而，保护银行本身只是拖延了问题。
Madrid’s role in the financial crisis has the erratic quality of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. It has veered unpredictably between embodying the euro’s greatest threat and pushing the reforms the monetary union badly needs. It is vital that the deal on eurozone financial assistance for Spain’s banks should be a step to a permanent solution and not a redoubling of past mistakes.
西班牙在金融危机中有点像“化身博士。它的角色飘忽不定，有时代表着欧元区最大的威胁，有时又在推进欧元区迫切需要的改革。欧元区对西班牙银行的救助应该是永久解决方案中的一步，而不应重蹈覆辙，这一点非常关键。
It is good that the agreement activates a new power granted to Europe’s rescue funds last year. Madrid will borrow money not for its main budget but for the Frob, its bank bailout fund. The assistance will be limited to the banking system, without Spain entering a programme subject to the eurozone-International Monetary Fund troika. This reward for genuine commitment to austerity and structural reform will hopefully prevent relations with Europe from becoming as poisoned as in some other countries.
所幸，此项救助协议激活了去年授予欧洲各救助基金的一项新权力。西班牙将把贷款用于本国的“银行有序重组基金(Frob)，而不是用于主要预算。援助将仅限于银行体系，西班牙不需要执行欧元区和国际货币基金组织(IMF)“三驾马车要求的项目。对实施紧缩和结构性改革的切实承诺予以奖励，西班牙与欧洲的关系将不至于弄僵，避免步其他一些国家的后尘。
The key dysfunction of the euro, however, is not addressed. Rather than sever the lethal embrace between stressed sovereign debt and weak banking systems, a cash advance to bail out banks with taxpayer funds adds to the burden of Madrid’s public finances. If the state of Spanish banks is much worse than expected, this action could amount to lending the country rope with which to hang itself – repeating the Irish mistake.
然而欧元最主要的功能障碍还是没有解决。用纳税人的资金来救助银行，不仅没有将问题主权债务与脆弱的银行体系之间致命的“纽带切断，还会加重西班牙公共财政的负担。如果西班牙银行业的状况明显比预期中更糟糕，此次行动就无异于借给该国上吊的绳子，这将重蹈爱尔兰的覆辙。
Until this prospect is banished, markets will not regain confidence in Spain, despite the strengths of its corporate sector, its structural reforms and a speedy macroeconomic adjustment. What is needed are bank resolution rules that cap taxpayer exposure. This means writing down shareholders and converting uninsured and unsecured debt into equity when banks cannot raise the capital they need.
如果这种可能性不消除，市场就无法对西班牙重拾信心，尽管西班牙企业状况良好、西班牙也在采取结构性改革和快速的宏观经济调整。现在需要的是拟定银行清理规则，其中要限定纳税人的负担。也就是说，当银行无法募集到需要的资金时，需要对股东减记，将没有保险和无担保的债务转变为股票。
If it dares, Madrid can take steps in this direction. It should stick to the €99bn envelope for the Frob’s investments – which means limiting the European credit line to the €80bn or so not already funded. It should also instruct the Frob not to inject capital before shareholders and creditors take a hit. That should make €80bn enough.
如果敢的话，西班牙可以在这个方向上采取行动，但应该在990亿欧元的“银行有序重组基金的框架下行动。也就是说，需要将欧洲信贷额度限制在尚未到位的800亿欧元。同时，还需要指示“银行有序重组基金，在股东和债权人承受损失之前不要向银行注入资金。因而800亿欧元是足够的。
The political obstacles are formidable. It would expose the political machinations behind banks that exploit public trust. Bankia, for example, flogged its shares to its retail savers, who will lose in a writedown. Also, Berlin is set against any losses for creditors as German savers and pensioners would be among them. Governments understandably fear the ire of victims of reckless banks. Protecting the banks themselves, however, only prolongs the problem.
政治阻碍令人生畏。这将暴露出利用公众信任的银行背后的政治图谋。比如Bankia就将其股票转移给个人储户，后者将在减记过程中遭受损失。同时，德国也反对债权人承受损失，因为一些德国储户和领养老金者就在债权人之列。政府担心行事轻率的银行的受害者会燃起熊熊怒火，这可以理解。然而，保护银行本身只是拖延了问题。
